The Vatican and Japan!!

Admiral Yamamoto (1884-1943).

Admiral Yamamoto was credited with planning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.

The Admiral was killed in an ambush in the South Pacific in 1943. The Roosevelt Reich Navy had broken the Japanese naval code long before Pearl Harbor and knew EVERY move that the Admiral and the Japanese Navy were making.

"One of the most important Japanese Catholics in this period was Admiral Yamamoto who was the first convert to Catholicism in 1893 at the French Marianists' School in Japan. He had traveled widely, especially in Europe. In early 1938 Yamamoto had told friends in Rome that conflict between Japan and the United States was inevitable because of the clash of races and of commercial interests; that Japan was preparing for war; and when the first blow would be struck. it would be a terrific one."(Quigley, Peace without Hiroshima, p. 75).

Admiral Yamamoto was the son of a poor school teacher from the village of Kushigun, Sonshomura. His father Sadakichi, was fifty-six years old when his 7th son was born so he named him Isoroku (fifty-six) in Japanese characters. Yamamoto had no royal blood and certainly no money but he rose to command the Combined Japanese Fleet.

Money was no object to the Jesuits however who were trying to reestablish a beachhead in Japan since there expulsion in 1607. Yamamoto was placed in charge of the Combined Japanese Fleet in 1939 and promoted to Admiral in 1940.

Japan was supposed to attack Russia in 1941

In Sept. 1940, Japan, Italy and Germany signed the Tripartite Pact.

In the Spring of 1941, Hitler was ready to invade the Soviet Union with the largest invasion force in the history of the world. This invasion force was supplied with oil by the Rockefeller owned Standard Oil Co., and trucks by the Ford Motor Co.

While Hitler attacked from the West, Japan was supposed to attack Russia from the East.

The Japanese were afraid to attack Russia because they had a very healthy respect for the Red Army after the Russians annihilated a Japanese army in Manchuria in August 1939. Hitler never sent observers to that battle because he had nothing but disdain for the fighting ability of the Red Army.

Roosevelt was FURIOUS when Japan failed to attack Russia!!

Fuehrer Franklin was furious when Japan refused to attack Russia. His advisers told him that unless Japan opened a second front in the East, the Nazi hordes would be swallowed up in the vastness of Russia and Hitler might lose the war.

He also needed a war in order to serve a fourth and fifth term as President. This would allow him to pack the Supreme Court with his cronies in order to destroy the Constitution. He maneuvered the Japanese into attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and Japan and the U.S. were at war . . . instead of Japan and Russia. In May, 1940, Roosevelt ordered the U.S. fleet moved from its headquarters in California to Pearl Harbor. The Navy had was already listening in on Japanese naval traffic:

"During the last days of September and first week of October 1940, a team of Army and Navy cryptographers solved the two principal Japanese government code systems: Purple, the major diplomatic code, and portions of the Kaigun Ango, a series of twenty-nine separate Japanese naval operational codes used for radio contact with warships, merchant vessels, naval bases, and personnel in overseas posts, such as naval attachés. Much has been made of the Purple Code and far too little of the navy codes. Historians have made misleading references to the Purple Code by confusing its use and purpose. It was used solely by the Japanese Foreign Ministry for encoding diplomatic messages dispatched by radio between Tokyo and selected overseas embassies and consulates. In the United States, Japan issued the Purple system to its Washington embassy and to its consulate in Manila, but not to the Honolulu consulate. The Purple Code was never used by the Japanese Navy. (Stinnett, Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, p. 21)

The Japanese took the bait and attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. Roosevelt had his war at last.

Japan established diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1942

Ken Harada, Japanese ambassador to the Vatican.

Japan established diplomatic relations with Vatican city in 1942. The first ambassador's name was Ken Harada:

"Among the inhabitants of Vatican City at that time were the members of the small Japanese Mission to the Holy See. When the Holy See and Japan entered upon a form of diplomatic relations in 1942 the war was already three years old in Europe and Pearl Harbor had already been attacked. Negotiations between Vatican representatives and the Japanese Government looking to the establishment of relations had been carried on sporadically for a couple of decades. War conditions, however, had convinced the Japanese of the need of representation at the famed "listening post." (Quigley, Peace without Hiroshima, p. 7).

Japanese Emperor was considered a direct descendant of the sun goddess

Like the Pope at Rome who is the earthy representative of Circe, Cybele or Diana of the Ephesians, the Japanese Emperor was considered the earthy representative of the great mother goddess:


The sun goddess Amaterasu. The Emperor was considered a direct descendant of this sun goddess. Japan is unique because the false mother goddess was always associated with the MOON.



Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989).

The Japanese Emperor was considered the direct descendant of the sun goddess. He was held in as much esteem as the Roman Catholics hold the Pope. To kill the Emperor was like killing god. Unconditional surrender was considered a threat to the life of the Emperor.

Roosevelt's "unconditional surrender" imperiled the life of the Emperor!!

In 1943 at Casablana, Roosevelt changed the surrender terms to "unconditional surrender." He knew that this would prolong the war and give him more time in the White House. Here is an excerpt from the book The Decision to Use the Bomb:

"The standing U.S. demand for "unconditional surrender" directly threatened not only the person of the Emperor but such central tenets of Japanese culture as well. Because of the Emperor's unique political and religious status, U.S. leaders were repeatedly advised of three related but quite distinct points:

First, a surrender would likely be accepted only if the Japanese people were assured the Emperor-God would neither be removed from his throne nor harmed (or tried and possibly hanged as a war criminal, as German leaders were about to be tried).

Second, even more important, U.S. leaders were advised that if such assurances were not given, the Japanese would likely fight to the last man. Very few Japanese units had surrendered in the bloody island fighting, and there was ample evidence that the Japanese soldier was prepared to die for the Emperor. The U.S. military understood that if no assurances for the Emperor were given—whether called "conditions" or not—it would almost certainly mean a struggle to the death.

Third, the president and his chief advisers were counseled that the Emperor would play a critical role in maintaining internal order in postwar Japan-and, indeed, in helping head off the possibility of chaos or even Communist-inspired revolutionary attempts.9The "unconditional" language had originally been adopted almost accidentally by Roosevelt at the January 1943 Casablanca conference. Cordell Hull recalled that it had not, in fact, originally been part of State Department strategy: "We were as much surprised as Mr. Churchill when, for the first time, the President, in the Prime Minister's presence, stated it suddenly to a press conference."

The formula proved to be controversial not only because of its uncompromising tone but also, ironically, because of its ambiguity. At Casablanca, Roosevelt seemingly qualified his position at the same time he defined it when he stated that "unconditional surrender" did not mean the destruction of the peoples of Germany, Japan, and Italy; rather, it meant the destruction of the "philosophy" which had brought about world war. Given the importance of religious ideas in their political culture, of course, this was equally threatening to Japanese leaders.
Roosevelt further complicated matters when in an address to White House press correspondents on February 12, 1943, he affirmed the policy in a way which now seemed to threaten the Emperor's person:

The only terms on which we shall deal ... are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "unconditional surrender." In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders."

The original announcement of the surrender demand had jolted not only Japan but many knowledgeable American policy-makers. Japanese propaganda had moved quickly to rally support for the war by predicting Japan's complete and absolute destruction under "unconditional surrender." Numerous officials in Washington understood the difficulties the formula presented, and several actively began to search for ways to modify and soften its impact. (Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Bomb, pp. 36-37).

The Pope wanted to get rid of the Japanese Imperial Dynasty!!

The Vatican was secretly praying for an end of the Japanese Imperial Dynasty. That was what was behind the unconditional surrender terms of Roosevelt.

The Emperor of Japan was more than a political ruler. Like the Pope at Rome, he represented the false goddess to his people. The Japanese people were patriotic however because they did not look to a foreigner as their political or religious ruler. That made the Emperor a competitor to the Vatican. Leahy, Groves and Byrnes allowed the Emperor to stay because they needed a quick surrender in order to prevent a Soviet invasion of Japan.

Ambassador Harada sent several peace messages to Tokyo

In a typical Machiavellian maneuver, the Vatican made war on the Japanese through their boys Leahy, Groves and Byrnes while at the same time helping them to surrender:

Martin S. Quigley. Secret agent for the O.S.S. in Vatican City.


Martin S. Quigley was a secret agent for the O.S.S. —Office of Strategic Services founded by William (Wild Bill) Donovan. He was instructed to contact the Japanese Papal ambassador about negotiating the surrender of Japan.

He dealt with several high ranking members of the hierarchy including Monsignor Ottaviani later to become Cardinal Ottaviani.

The messages were sent via Vatican radio to Switzerland and then relayed to Tokyo. The messages were decoded and read in Washington the next day.

No replies from Tokyo were received unless the messages were intercepted. This way at least the Vatican could gain sympathy from Japan by trying to stop the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Here is an excerpt from the book by Martin S. Quigley:

The Vatican radio official saw that the message comprised three typed pages and remarked that it probably would not be broadcast for a couple of hours in view of the backlog. Watanabe urged that Harada's message should be sent out as soon as possible as it was a priority communication to the Foreign Minister. As he walked out of the radio office, the Japanese

"At that period the Vatican Radio was operating with relatively dated equipment installed years before the war. It lacked the power to transmit direct to Tokyo. The Japanese, of course, knew this. All along they had been using a modern and very powerful installation at their Embassy in Berne, Switzerland, not only for traffic from there but for relaying messages from their missions in Sweden and Spain, as well as the few originating at the Vatican.

That afternoon an operator at the Japanese Embassy in Berne picked up and recorded the Harada message. It was promptly rebroadcast. The transmission was automatically recorded at the Foreign Office's communications center in Japan. Within a matter of minutes the message was played back to a specialist in decrypting and then run through the decoding machine which printed out the words in Japanese. A copy was made for the files of the center and the original was sealed in an envelope; it was then given to a dispatch carrier who took it by motorcycle to the Foreign Office. There it was signed for at the message desk. In a few moments another messenger took it to the office of the secretary to the Foreign Minister.

As the Berne transmission was crackling through the atmosphere, it was recorded in England simultaneously with its recording in Tokyo. As it was identified as being in a Japanese code—the huge establishment concentrated on German messages—the Japanese message was sent on at once to the United States. This division of decoding labors was one of the smoothest in British-American military relations.

In Washington at Arlington Hall, an exclusive girls school until taken over by the government, over a thousand extremely bright men and women worked in one of the most "hush hush" organizations of the wartime military establishment. Physical conditions were cramped and there was never enough space for comfortable working arrangements because the staff was constantly expanding to handle the mounting volume of Japanese intercepts.

Decrypting and decoding are among the most arcane of human activities. Even with the aid of sophisticated machines, they call upon a host of intellectual talents and, as some believed, a measure of wizardry. Having started the war with a handful of specialists in this area—veterans of the era when, as Secretary of War Stimson had put it, "gentlemen do not read other people's mail"—the military had to recruit extensively" (Quigley, Peace without Hiroshima, pp. 124-125).

Martin S. Quigley and Monsignor (later Cardinal) Ottaviani) in front of the Papal Palace.

To be continued


Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. Kodansha Intl., Tokyo, 1979.

Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Bomb. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1995.

Potter, John Deane. Yamamoto The Man who Menaced America. Viking Press, New York, 1965.

Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, Free Press (a division of Simon & Schuster Inc.), New York, 2000.

Quigley, Martin S. Peace without Hiroshima: Secret Actions at the Vatican in Spring of 1945. Madison Books, Lanham, Maryland, 1991.

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